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ABSTRACT Ghanaian governments since independence have had to align either with the
East or the West depending on the government’s ideological orientation. For Ghana, national
development has been the main propelling factor to enter into the international system. The
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), a military regime, succeeded in balancing
external relations between the East and the West before the collapse of communism. The out-
comes of external economic relations were mixed. Whereas relationships, especially with the
Bretton Woods institutions led to impressive macroeconomic indicators, the impacts on the
wellbeing of majority of the people were negative. Domestic policy measures were tailored
to satisfy foreign interests. In the process, the nation’s debt burden escalated and the nation is
yet to reap lasting and positive benefits from the regime’s international economic relations.
Key Words: Neo-liberalism; Modus operandi; System-centric; State-centric; Society-centric
paradigms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, foreign economic policy actions of Ghanaian governments had
basically been the by-product of formal political interactions of Ghana with the
international system. That is, foreign economic relations that centre on trade, foreign
aid and investment played second fiddle to traditional foreign policy concerns with
its known political bias. Ghana under the Provisional National Defence Council
(PNDC) which came to power through a military coup on December 31, 1981, was
no exception until the mid-1980’s. Initially, the regime claimed to be socialist and
had no clearly defined policy for international economic relations or foreign eco-
nomic policy.
After its very poor start in terms of international economic relations, the PNDC
was able to establish solid foreign economic relations with countries across the ideo-
logical spectrum. Very good relations with the IMF/World Bank and other interna-
tional financial institutions (IFIs) greatly influenced Ghana’s relations with other
developed economies and to some extent some developing ones. In time, the
PNDC’s relations with the West in particular was predicated on good relations with
the Bretton Woods institutions.(1)
The PNDC’s change of ideological orientation in April 1983 led to the pursuit of
an overly aggressive foreign economic policy. Many questions naturally arise in this
context. What theoretical constructs best explain the regime’s behaviour domesti-
cally and externally with specific reference to international economic relations or
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policies? To what extent was the PNDC influenced by Ghana’s history of interna-
tional economic relations? What form(s) did the regime’s international economic
relations take, and what were the outcomes of such policy measures and the lessons
for future foreign economic policy decision making?
This essay is on Ghana’s international economic relations under the PNDC. The
focal point of the paper is the unprecedented cordial relations with the IMF and the
World Bank. Given the regime’s initial Marxist posturing, the question is whether
the closer relationships with the West and the IMF/World Bank were the outcome of
political pragmatism or opportunism at the expense of traditional foreign policy
concerns.(2) I argue that neo-liberalism gained ascendancy due to both the intricate
relationship between domestic economic needs and international expectations and
the ability of the regime to “read the signs of the times” which some may call prag-
matism or opportunism. Furthermore, neo-liberal postulations were complemented
with aspects of realism with emphasis on a strong state with a tight security system
that dealt ruthlessly with political opponents both real and imagined. Consequently,
the PNDC not only succeeded in pursuing balanced international relations but
equally in winning the support of the West for financial assistance. In the process,
the Ghanaian economy became aid-driven more than ever before. Arguably, the
modus operandi of the regime would seem to suggest that various paradigms influ-
enced policy options as and when needed in formulating policies to tackle problems
of domestic political economy and interactions with the international community.
In 1966 the Convention People’ Party (CPP) led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was
overthrown. Ever since, foreign economic policy has revolved around attempts by
governments to forge closer relations with the IMF and the Bank. With the excep-
tion of the National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC),
successor governments after the overthrow of Nkrumah had very little time to
embark on lasting economic diplomacy.(3)
A brief theoretical underpinnings of foreign economic policy decision making is
followed by a historical overview which highlights aspects of Ghana’s international
economic relations with the West and the Bretton Woods institutions. The rest of the
paper examines various internal and external political and economic dynamics of the
PNDC era.
II. THEORETICAL BASIS OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
Several theoretical concepts have informed studies on foreign economic decision-
making or policies, especially of developed countries. Some of these are interna-
tional or system-centric, society-centric, and state-centric paradigms or approaches
(Ikenberry, et al., 1988). The system-centric approach perceives foreign economic
policy as being influenced by the attributes or capabilities of the state in relation to
others in the international system. Michael Sullivan defined these attributes as “any-
thing that describes the make-up of a nation, differentiating one state from another in
terms of political, social, economic or as some might argue psychological character-
istics” (Sullivan, 1976: 103). Policy makers in this context are deemed to react to
given set of issues in accordance with the relative position of their country in the
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international pecking order. The society-centric paradigm views foreign economic
policy as a reflection of the relative position of various groups or classes in a nation.
The type of policy that would be adopted bears the imprint of the dominant class or
group. This paradigm “explains foreign economic policy essentially as a function of
domestic politics” (Ikenberry, et al., 1988: 2). The state-centric paradigm takes into
consideration the influence of state institutional structures as well as political and
administrative officials on foreign economic policy. The relationship between
domestic institutions and the officials who man them may either enhance or con-
strain foreign economic policy decision making.
The foregoing paradigms could be juxtaposed with what Peter Katzenstein identi-
fied as basic influences on foreign economic decision-making of developed coun-
tries. He identified these as the nationalist, realist, and neo-liberal paradigms of
international politics (Katzenstein, 1976). The bedrock of the nationalist paradigm is
the concept of inter-penetration, defined “in terms of the predictability of mutual
behaviour within societies and measured by the volume of goods, services, and peo-
ple exchanged between them” (Katzenstein, 1976: 4). The rate at which nation-
states interact with each other through trade, exchange of technical know-how and
the frequency of interactions among the citizens through tourism and other
exchanges may influence policy options of such nation-states. Inter-penetration
potentially affects the socio-economic and cultural needs, aspirations, and expecta-
tions of members of a particular nation and thus influence or shape policy.
The realist paradigm conceptualises any interaction between states as the outcome
of diplomatic bargaining. Government action is construed as goal-oriented and
based on rational choice. Katzenstein pointed out that “political decision makers are
thought of as endowed with maximum information, as carefully calculating the
trade-offs between different strategies, and intent on maximising political benefits in
their strategies and bargains” (Katzenstein, 1976: 8).
The neo-liberal paradigm draws heavily on orthodox economics and international
trade. It perceives the foreign economic policies of governments as being driven by
both domestic and external social and economic conditions. The interactions of
nation-states in the international system are therefore contingent on domestic attrib-
utes and external influences.
Although the foregoing approaches have been applied in the study and analyses
of the foreign economic policies of advanced industrial nations, they are of equal
relevance, in my view, in analysing similar policies of dependent nations. In prac-
tice, one could see clear overlapping of various theories as the underdeveloped
nations grapple with the problems of national survival. This was the lot of the
PNDC.
So far as Ghana under the PNDC was concerned, the neo-liberal paradigm offers
the best theoretical grounding for understanding foreign economic decision-making.
Katzenstein (1976: 11) rightly argued:
The neo-liberal paradigm has been very successful over the last decade in picking up
the shift from security to prosperity concerns in government policies as well as in
pointing to the prominence of domestic factors in the expanding scope of policy. In
addition it has drawn attention to the cross-currents affecting government policy. On
75Ghana’s Politics of International Economic Relations
20-2/1  03.4.3  9:48 AM  ページ75
the one hand international forces of growing importance subject governments to
impartial and rigorous logic of the international market. On the other hand, these inter-
national forces also increase citizens’ aspirations and demands and, with them, gov-
ernment objectives in domestic policies.
Ghana is a unique case because since independence in 1957, both economic and
political foreign policy orientation seem to have been influenced, either by omission
or commission, by some of the approaches standing independently or in combina-
tion with others. I underscore that unlike industrial countries, dependent states such
as Ghana are often compelled by systemic and societal influences to compromise a
particular foreign economic policy in exchange for financial assistance from the
West. The PNDC offers a classic example of a Ghanaian regime that, to a large
extent combined most of the approaches highlighted above. However, the influence
of, and lessons from distinctive historical underpinnings of foreign policy decision-
making of past governments provided the basis for its interactions with the interna-
tional system.
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Ghanaian national leaders since 1966 have been compelled by dire economic and
political exigencies to experiment with various approaches to national development
and international interactions.(4) While efforts have been made to steer the nation
from the profoundly political bias of Nkrumah’s foreign policy, the salience of his
approach, and the successes he chalked on the international stage have made it diffi-
cult for successive governments and regimes to chart overly economically biased
foreign policy orientation. In effect, the attempts may be successor governments to
completely shed off vestiges of radical foreign policy orientation after Nkrumah had
mixed results.
The PNDC after coming to power in 1981 adopted domestic and foreign policies
similar to the Nkrumah regime at the tail end of its administration, especially ideo-
logically. One major difference was that while the PNDC was a military junta, the
CPP under Nkrumah was a civilian administration. It is significant also to note that
the trajectory of various governments’ periods of administration influenced policy
choices to some extent. It was not surprising that Nkrumah’s foreign policies were
overly political. Nkrumah’s administration coincided with two main international
events that undoubtedly influenced his foreign policy orientation. The first was the
cold war which pitched the East against the West for dominance in international
affairs; the second was the process of decolonization which incidentally was sup-
ported by the two main protagonists of the cold war era — the former Soviet Union
and the United States of America. Ghana became the first country south of the
Sahara to attain independence. Ghana therefore saw herself as a pacesetter in Africa
in many respects. Consequently, Nkrumah marshalled state as well as diplomatic
resources in the struggle for the total decolonization of Africa. Diplomatic initiatives
and interactions in the international system were geared toward making Ghana the
epicentre of the African struggle against colonialism.(5) In the process, alliances were
forged with other developing countries with the objective of making the voice of
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developing nations respected in the community of nations. Attempts at the twilight
of Nkrumah’s administration to reach an agreement with the IMF and the World
Bank fizzled out due to Nkrumah’s refusal to accept IMF conditions. Nkrumah’s
refusal to adopt IMF policies had the immediate impact of foreclosing Western
sources of credit to the government. Just before Nkrumah’s overthrow, a mission of
the Fund invited by the government observed:
The Ghana economy is severely constrained, the balance of payments is in serious
deficits, and the country’s foreign exchange reserves are at a precariously low level.
Foreign debt repayments are increasingly putting added pressure on the balance of
payments. The cause of the difficulty is not only the fall in cocoa price but also the
excess of total government spending; a period of consolidation is urgently needed; to
delay action would make the inevitable adjustment onerous. (Ghana Economic Survey,
1965: 50)
The economy was in dire straits as foreign investors lost confidence in the Ghanaian
economy, shortages of commodities were pervasive, and inflation was very high.
The overthrow of Nkrumah gave the military regime, the National Liberation
Council (NLC), the opportunity to realign Ghana’s external relations. Nkrumah was
overly pro-East, because he was fascinated by the rapid economic development in
the East and because he espoused socialism. This also influenced his development
strategy. Central planning with the establishment of many state-owned enterprises
became the fulcrum of economic policy. The pro-East stance of the regime was
overwhelming, even though American finance contributed to the construction of the
Akosombo Hydro-Electric power station.
What may be deemed as a clear but terse formulation of foreign economic policy,
was made by the NLC. The chairman of the NLC, Lt. General J. A. Ankrah stated
emphatically that Ghana “shall make full use of the IMF and the World Bank and its
associated institutions” (Boafo-Arthur, 1989: 149) In reaction to Nkrumah policies,
the NLC readily turned to the West. The snag, however, was that by focusing basi-
cally on the Fund and the Bank the potential of any fruitful economic interactions
with other countries was not fully exploited. This appeared to be reasonable at the
time not only because of the grim economic conditions of the country but also the
economic clout and influence of the two Bretton Woods institutions vis-à-vis other
IFIs. A certificate of creditworthiness from the IMF and the Bank was needed to
facilitate further economic interactions with Western nations. The rationale, would
have helped to open the gates for fruitful economic relations with the West and
thereby attract investments that had almost dried up in reaction to the socialist poli-
cies of Nkrumah. It could be argued then that the seed of neo-liberal economic
development since independence was sown by the NLC. The regime after reaching
an accord with the Fund and the Bank started divesting some state enterprises. The
NLC also froze relations with the East. By so doing, it became necessary to also
expel technical advisers from the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European
countries who were in charge of various projects in Ghana. Thus, Nkrumah’s pro-
East bias of international economic relations was substituted with pro-West bias by
the NLC.
Subsequently, the NLC became a ready recipient of IMF support and in May
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1966 a $36.4 million stand-by arrangement was approved for the country. During
the period of its administration (1966-1969), four stand-by credits and a compen-
satory financing facility worth $78.4 million and $17.25 million respectively were
approved for the country (Jonah, 1989: 100). However, by the time the NLC handed
over power, after general elections, to the Progress Party (PP) government led by Dr.
Busia in 1969, the Rehabilitation Programme undertaken with IMF support had had
very little or no impact on the economic wellbeing of Ghanaians. The Bank admit-
ted in a review that the economic measures generated no improvement in export per-
formance despite the 30% devaluation of the currency (Jonah, 1989: 100). The only
discernible change was the realignment of the nation’s international political and
economic friends.
The PP government maintained the international economic relations charted by
the NLC. The fact is, most of the high level ministers of the PP government includ-
ing the Prime Minister Busia, were top-level functionaries of the NLC regime.
Furthermore, given the liberal orientation of the government of Dr. Busia in a cold
war era, the Progress Party was overly antagonistic to the Eastern bloc. The govern-
ment renewed faith in the IMF and the Bank and invited missions from the two
institutions to visit assess the economic situation. After much wrangling (acrimony
within cabinet, shuttling between Accra and Western capitals by the Prime Minister,
and series of meetings with the IFI officials) Busia accepted IMF conditionalities in
December 1971. Seventeen days after announcing the devaluation of the national
currency in conformity with the dictates of the IMF the government was overthrown
by the military. The PP government had neglected to find the means of appeasing
contending interests and thus failed.
As Busia’s foreign economic policy was reminiscent of that of the NLC, this led
to a complete take-over of Ghana’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning by
agents of external financial institutions.(6) The PP government’s administration
underlines a fundamental feature of Third World countries’ relations with the
IMF/World Bank. In sum, “powerful multilateral institutions like the Fund and the
Bank can take over the bureaucracy of a weak Third World country like Ghana and
reorganise it as well as create within it what they consider to be an appropriate struc-
tural network for implementing their policies” (Jonah, 1989: 102). To some extent,
the PP government’s experiences with the IFIs, the Bank and the Fund give cre-
dence to the system-centric perspective that a “nation-state’s position in the interna-
tional economy decisively shapes its foreign economic policy.” For a developing
country such as Ghana, the bottom-line is subservience at any price because the pur-
suit of independent policies or economic relations is almost always constrained by
the level of the nation’s dependency.
The National Redemption Council (NRC) and later the Supreme Military Council
(SMC I & II) formed after the overthrow of the PP government in 1972 marked a
completely new strand of foreign economic policy approach in Ghanaian politics. In
his first radio and television broadcast after the coup, General Acheampong
“accused Busia of permitting excessive international influence and of failure to take
more radical action to suspend payment on the much publicised external debts”
(Frimpong-Ansah, 1991: 108). The Acheampong regime therefore adopted “a mix-
ture of self-propelling, self-reliant approach to development and growth through the
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maximisation of domestic resource mobilisation and the repudiation of the country’s
international financial obligations, especially debt repayments which were due, but
deemed to have been dubiously contracted” (Boafo-Arthur, 1999a). NRC’s eco-
nomic nationalism that was expressed through active interventionist policy served as
a major platform for any form of international economic relations contemplated by
the NRC. For instance, the regime took 55% of the equity shares in foreign mining
and timber enterprises; 50% shares in the breweries; and 40% shares in foreign
owned banking and insurance companies.(7) This was much to the consternation of
international finance capital. Nonetheless, Acheampong’s economic nationalism met
the aspirations of powerful constituents who felt that the previous government was
overly subservient to international capitalist manipulation; and had failed to exploit
domestic capabilities to the maximum.(8)
The NRC’s policy of economic nationalism was given legal backing with the pro-
mulgation of the Investment Policy Decree 1975 (NRCD 329). The outcome of that
policy was that:
The state could acquire directly 13,189,471 shares ...in twenty-four foreign companies.
It could acquire some more shares indirectly through parastatal organisations. In con-
trast, foreign companies lost to the state, Ghanaian entrepreneurs and individual share-
holders 62,181,004 worth of shares. Largely because of this policy the NLC’s sale of
some state-owned enterprises was nullified; and the state sector became widely
expanded again. At the same time however Ghanaian private participation in the econ-
omy expanded considerably. And so did the joint enterprise sector. (Jonah, 1989: 103)
Foreign capital was under attack under the NRC. Foreign creditors had no choice
than to accommodate the policies being pursued and granted Ghana unprecedented
debt rescheduling terms.(9) In the estimation of many, including the Bank and the
Fund, the main obstacle to close international economic relationship with the Fund
and the Bank was General Acheampong. This explains why soon after his overthrow
in a palace coup in July 1978, the relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions
were normalized, and the Fund immediately granted a stand-by credit of SDR 53.0
million spread over twelve months with the usual conditionalities.(10)
On 4th June 1979, the SMC II regime led by General Fred Akuffo was overthrown
by the junior ranks of the Ghana Armed Forces. The armed forces made Flight
Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings whom they released from prison the chairman of the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The coup was staged at a time the
country was in the process of being ushered into civilian administration. The AFRC
automatically became an interim government and supervised the already laid down
mechanisms for a return to constitutional rule. The Peoples’ National Party (PNP)
led by Dr Hilla Limann won the presidential elections and his party also won major-
ity seats in parliament.
The poor economic situation since the last days of the First Republic under
Nkrumah led to various kinds of pressure on successor governments to accede to
IMF and World Bank demands. The PNP was not immune to these external and
internal pressures. The general expectation in international circles, therefore, was
that the new leader would realign foreign policy interactions after the quasi-isola-
tionist policy by the NRC. However, any form of international interactions had to
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take into consideration the precarious economic situation and the implications (both
positive and negative) of any relationship on the generality of the people.
It must be underscored that the PNP had a peculiar ideological problem. It was an
offshoot of the CPP of Nkrumah(11) and the prospects of IMF dependency stirred
internal party opposition, especially from the party’s youth wing. Every interaction
with the international capitalist system, according to Limann must be based on the
social needs of the people. With regard to the implications of IMF/World Bank poli-
cies on the people, Limann argued that “every action must be related to the social
climate... The government is a major employer and we are dealing with human
beings, we cannot simply carry out a massive dismissal of workers” (Jonah, 1989:
109). Limann’s resistance to the IMF left in limbo any form of foreign economic
relations with the IMF/World Bank, and in the process, undermined confidence in
the economy by the IFIs and to some extent the nation’s trading partners. It must
be added that agreement with the IMF would probably have assured the trading
partners that the nation would obtain foreign loans to service debts owed to
them.(12)
However, it does not appear that national strategies aimed at attracting direct for-
eign investments were seriously pursued. This may partially be attributed to the rela-
tively short periods such governments administered the affairs of Ghana.(13)
IV. DOMESTIC EXIGENCIES AND INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
UNDER THE PNDC
From the outset, the PNDC put itself in an ideological bind(14) and had no other
choice than to restructure political and economic relations along socialist lines. This
seeming intractable position was made more compelling by the key advisers of the
PNDC as well as the main support base.(15) They espoused socialism as a develop-
mental strategy and this ultimately influenced the international friends cultivated by
the regime and governmental structures put in place during the early phase of its
rule. Within the PNDC, however, there were others who had liberal tendencies and
were not overly opposed to any form of interactions with foreign capital whether
from the IMF/World Bank or from any other source.(16) Before mid-1983, classical or
neo-liberal approach or solutions to national economic problems was an anathema to
the PNDC.
The belief held by key government officials was that Ghana’s economic problems
were the outcome of the nation’s incorporation into the international economy. The
immediate concern therefore was the initiation of populist structural economic and
social reforms. The management of state enterprises and corporations were therefore
placed in the hands of Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) while
Ghanaian elite and entrepreneurs were verbally harangued and stigmatised as impe-
rialist lackeys. However, apart from rhetorical attacks on imperialism and Western
capitalism, no serious measures aimed at restructuring the economic base of the
country were implemented for lack of financial resources. Radical students of ter-
tiary institutions, workers, the armed forces, and socialist-inclined organisations
such as the June Fourth Movement (JFM), the New Democratic Movement (NDM),
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the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG), and the African Youth
Command (AYC) formed the support base of the PNDC. They were overwhelm-
ingly opposed to relations with the West, especially with the IMF and the Bank.
For the regime to be able to realign international economic relations in favour of
the IFIs and the West, effective control of the radical left within the PNDC, among
Rawlings’ advisers, and the general support base was needed. In addition, the
PNDC had to be prepared to dispense with the friendship of the so-called interna-
tional “pariah” regimes such as that of Muammar Gadaffi of Libya if it wanted to
gain recognition in the West and thereby obtain the needed financial support from
the West. The more difficult of the two was dispensing with Muammar Gadaffi for
the sake of Western capital. It was alleged that Libya financed the military take-over
of 1981 and that the arms to stage the coup were smuggled into Ghana from Libya.
Moreover, Libya proved to be the only nation that readily came to the aid of the
fledgling PNDC, as Rawlings himself noted, “in a time of crisis when other coun-
tries were sitting on the fence.”(17) Thus while serious domestic measures were
needed to solve serious economic problems, the approach of the PNDC fell short of
the expectations of the West whose support was tied to the pursuit of foreign eco-
nomic and domestic policies acceptable to the IMF/World Bank, in particular, and
Western donor nations, in general.
V. THE UNDERPINNINGS OF INITIAL POLICY MEASURES
The underlying factors that influenced initial policy measures were both domestic
and external. The PNDC’s policy-framework was aimed at ensuring national sur-
vival “in the face of what was perceived as a very hostile international environment,
especially the constraints to internal development imposed by the neo-colonial and
imperialist-dominated international economy, and to stimulate economic growth and
gain self-sufficiency” (Boafo-Arthur, 1993: 143). Rawlings called for a radical trans-
formation of the socio-economic and political order so as to contain national eco-
nomic, political and social retrogression and degradation. Advocating such
structural changes, in the view of Emmanuel Hansen (1987), the first Secretary to
the PNDC implied, (i) the termination of the control of the local economy by for-
eign multinational companies; (ii) changes in the structure of the control of the state;
(iii) the creation of political forms which would make the interests of the broad
masses of the people predominant and realisable; and (iv) a programme which
would initiate a process of improving the material conditions of the mass of the peo-
ple.(18)
The Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey while
presenting the revised budget for 1981-82 reiterated the conception that Ghana’s
underdevelopment was the result of undue exploitation by the capitalist nations. In
his view, the national economy was in crisis because of the “inevitable working of
the pattern of international economic relations, controlled by a concentration of inte-
grated multinational corporations in industry working hand in hand with transna-
tional banks” (GOG, 1982). It was felt that it was only by breaking the existing
inequitable international economic relations that the nation’s economic crisis could
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be solved and genuine economic development and growth initiated.
Careful reading of the Revised Budget of 1981-82 makes it clear that the PNDC
was confused as to the best approach to adopt in solving the economic problems of
the country. One can search for solutions when the real problems are identified.
However, while attacking international finance capital and the West generally for the
nation’s economic woes, the government in the same breath accused local manage-
ment for the problems of the nation. Commenting on the inconsistencies in the
Revised Budget Professor Kweku Folson (1993: 83) noted:
The opening paragraph of the preface, as a true neo-Marxist dependency theory, pre-
pared the reader for a radical socialist-revolutionary attack on the basic causes of the
‘unrelenting crisis’ in the Ghana economy. However, there was almost immediately a
shift away from basic structural causes to managerial factors which were blamed for
the ills of the economy. The precipitous fall in the value of the cedi was now blamed
not on the basic factors shaping the economy as set out in the opening paragraph, but
on ‘unprecedented mismanagement’ as exemplified by the past failure to establish
appropriate machinery for inducing increase in productivity and on the other condi-
tions militating against efficient management.(19)
The confusion as to the root cause(s) of the nation’s economic problems reflected
the differing ideological persuasions within the PNDC. The leftist elements felt the
problem was with the capitalist world order whilst the moderates and conservative
elements felt the leadership had to pay equal attention to domestic constraints to
development. With the dominant position of the left in the ruling junta and also the
core support base, the choice of international friends and policy measures initially
followed socialist prescriptions.
The change in orientation of the PNDC came as a result of the failure of the
regime to obtain the needed economic support from the East. This effectively under-
mined the influence and role of the radical left in the government. Those with leftist-
or Marxist-leaning had two options: Either to “commit ideological suicide” or resign
from the government. Key personalities in the government who had acquired reputa-
tion whilst teaching at the University of Ghana as Marxist socialists such as Kwesi
Botchwey, the long serving Finance Minister of the PNDC, and Tsatsu Tsikata, a
key Rawlings adviser who now heads the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation
(GNPC) took the first option. Young Marxist firebrands such as Zaya Yeebo the first
PNDC Secretary in charge of Youth and Sport, Chris Atim a member of the PNDC,
Akwasi Adu, Taata Ofosu and many others fled into exile.(20)
Without doubt, there were internal struggles among factions within the ruling
junta and their respective supporters in the body politic for influence and control of
both domestic and external economic policies. As postulated by the state-centric
approach, explanations of foreign economic policy are found in the ongoing struggle
for influence among domestic social forces or political groups. John Ikenberry, et al.
(1988: 7) argued further that “policy outcomes on any particular issue are a function
of the varying ability of groups to organise and give their interests prominence in
the policy process.” In this regard, government institutions become arenas for group
competition and the articulation of group interest. No past government in Ghana
symbolised these sharp competing interests more than the PNDC.
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It is instructive to note also that the Policy Guidelines issued by the regime in
1982 incorporated a blueprint to be followed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
the conduct of international relations. The Guidelines clearly opted for a closer rela-
tionship with “progressive” countries among others. Within one year three months,
the initial domestic economic policies that influenced the choice of international
friends had collapsed.
VI. RATIONALISING THE CHANGE IN POLICY ORIENTATION
The initial hopes of obtaining economic assistance from the Eastern bloc, espe-
cially the Soviet Union never materialised. A government delegation to the Soviet
Union came back empty-handed. While sympathising with the economic problems
of the country and expressing the willingness for closer collaboration in many fields,
the Russians pointed to their own problems that constrained their ability to assist
financially. The Ghanaian delegation was advised to go to the IMF and try at the
same time to hold on to the revolution.(21)
The negative outcome of the Russian trip had sobering effects on the radical left
within the PNDC and among the supporters. It undermined leftist influence on pol-
icy making and paved the way for realignment of relations.
Second, the fragile economic situation was compounded by the populist eco-
nomic policies implemented. These policies included the confiscation of the assets
of entrepreneurs, imposition of price controls, the imposition of heavy fines on those
alleged to have hoarded goods, the withdrawal of higher denomination currency
notes as a means of combating excess liquidity, and the take-over of some enter-
prises by Workers Defence Committees.(22) The policies failed to improve the eco-
nomic situation of the country and in addition severely reduced the incentives for
production, savings, domestic and foreign investments, and increased productiv-
ity.(23)
The measures were taken against the backdrop of economic stagnation over the
years. For instance, the leading export earner cocoa had declined in production from
450,000 tons in the early 1970’s to 180,000 in 1982. Manufacturing industries were
producing below capacity, and devastating drought and bush-fires in 1982-83 had
adversely affected cash and food crop production.
Politically, the question was how long the people could endure the economic
hardships after the promises of positive economic changes in the course of the revo-
lution. In the face of the failure of the initial policies the regime obviously faced the
prospects of losing political power to other contenders across the ideological
divide.(24) As Eboe Hutchful (1997: 254) pointed out, “the PNDC found it necessary
to deflect challenges to its authority—and, indeed, to its very hold on power—by
ranks disillusioned with the pace of the ‘revolution’ and the implementation of
declared policies.” To maintain political power after diffusing several countercoups,
the economic problem had to be tackled. The most appealing option was to reach an
agreement with the IMF irrespective of the earlier socialist posturing and unbridled
attacks on the West, in particular, and capitalism, in general. The PNDC’s readiness
to negotiate with the IMF was therefore due to an intricate combination of domestic
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economic and political imperatives. This further attests to the interface of domestic
and external policies.
While contending with domestic politico-economic problems emanating from the
wishes of the radical support base of the regime, clandestine negotiations were held
with the IMF. An agreement was reached with the IMF/World Bank and in April
1983 Ghana’s economic recovery programme was launched. Official government
pronouncements for consumption by domestic constituents and the international
community had to be in sync with the changed orientation of the PNDC. The
Finance Minister, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey underlined the spirit of change and the new
international economic relations by noting that:
Ghana will actively encourage direct foreign investment and ensure that while safe-
guarding the interest of the economy and honour of the people, investors will not be
frustrated when the time comes to transfer their profits and dividends to their share-
holders overseas. (West Africa, 4 June 1984: 1155)
The change in political orientation and ipso facto change in the focus of interna-
tional economic relations was complete by the end of 1983. Efforts were geared
toward bringing radical supporters on board or to put them in permanent check. It
was in this connection that Rawlings cautioned against empty revolutionary
rhetoric. With particular reference to radical workers who had originally given
staunch support to the revolution Rawlings declared: “We can no longer postpone
the time for halting the populist nonsense...We must not get into the way of thinking
that revolutionary activities are substitutes for productive work” (West Africa, 12
Sept., 1983: 21-23).
There were overt and covert official attacks on the socialist approach. These were
meant to convince donors that the regime had changed its ideological, economic,
and political orientation with regard to the international community and especially
the West. For instance, the Deputy Chairman of the PNDC, Justice D. F. Annan
stated that the PNDC’s initial dalliance with Marxism “did us a certain amount of
harm, in that it sought a short cut to modern government on the basis of the experi-
ence of Europe which was not quite germane” (West Africa, 28 Jan., 1985: 1987).
Justice Annan was emphatic also on the shift from the “blood and thunder” politics
initially adopted and confessed to the inappropriateness of Marxism or socialism.
The denunciation of Marxism-Leninism was of political and economic signifi-
cance. Generally, it demonstrated the emergent politics of the regime in its relations
with domestic constituents and the international system with reference to economic
relations. Politically, the new approach won the support of liberals and the elite who
were initially perceived as imperialist agents and consequently antagonised and
marginalised. In domestic economic terms, the changed approach also gave some
hope to domestic entrepreneurs most of whose businesses had been confiscated or
closed down in the course of the revolution. Thus in its effort to maintain power, the
change in policies broadened the domestic support base and placated Western
donors. For the IMF and the World Bank, that was the precise setting they had antic-
ipated from the pressures exerted. Theoretically, neo-liberalism gradually replaced
the socialist underpinnings of the regime. Again, it demonstrates the indispensability
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of domestic explanation in any analysis of foreign economic policies or interactions.
VII. THE PNDC’S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Even though the PNDC made relations with the IMF/World Bank the centrepiece
of its relations with the international community for reasons stated above, its brand
of international interactions whether economic or political, differed from most of its
predecessors. The NLC closed the door to the Eastern bloc after the overthrow of
Dr. Nkrumah. The Progress Party government of Dr. Busia had very little to do with
socialist governments and largely maintained the frozen relations imposed by the
NLC. The NRC pursued a certain level of balanced political and economic relations.
However, the economic nationalism exhibited by General Acheampong was con-
trary to the expectations of the West even though Western creditors accommodated
the regime and rescheduled debts owed by Ghana.
After implementing IMF/World Bank imposed stabilising policies, the PNDC vir-
tually had to disavow socialism. Nonetheless, and unlike earlier governments, politi-
cal and economic relations with so-called progressive regimes in the international
system continued. The point is, the PNDC reasoned, and rightly too, that it was nec-
essary to maintain that sort of relationship for two main reasons. The first was to
underline national sovereignty, and secondly, for the sake of national interest. It was
clear that the PNDC had learned objective lessons from the failures of earlier gov-
ernments that were either overly pro-West or pro-East and thereby foreclosed poten-
tial sources of assistance from one or the other. Thus, whereas the regime was doing
everything possible, including making the right statements to win Western capital
for economic development, it presented another face of dealing evenly with the
internationally accepted ideological divide, at least until the collapse of commu-
nism. It was a pragmatic approach if not the full essence of political brinkmanship.
The newly found policy of the PNDC was in line with what Brigadier Nunoo-
Mensah a leading member of the PNDC had noted at the inception of PNDC rule.
This was at a time the PNDC and the core support base of the regime favoured
socialism and the adoption of a posture of what Naomi Chazan (1984: 106) term
“defiant isolationism.” Nunoo-Mensah noted:
We are making friends with everyone. We do not intend to take part in big power poli-
tics. We are too small and weak to get involved in that. We have stretched out our
hands to make friends with everyone regardless of his ideological thinking or his polit-
ical persuasion. (West Africa, 25 Jan. 1982: 8)
At the time such sentiments were expressed(25) the radical left had the ear of the
Chairman of the PNDC. It seems, therefore, that only a passing thought was given
to such a clear blueprint for a balanced relationship with the international commu-
nity at the outset.
The question is whether compatibility should be at any price. Making friends with
everyone was eventually followed by the PNDC to most probably ensure the com-
patibility of domestic politics with the international economy. Paradoxically, it was
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compatibility that was to border on subservience to external dictates. It seems that
the long-term implication of “national addiction” to external support was not seri-
ously factored into the relationship.(26) The PNDC could afford to ignore that because
the pursuit of the newly embraced foreign economic policy propelled by neo-liberal-
ism went hand in hand with unprecedented infraction on the rights of Ghanaians.(27)
In line with the desire to obtain the best in the international system for national
development, the PNDC, especially after the dogged implementation of IMF/World
Bank programmes, intensified relationship with other nations capable of offering
economic assistance. It appears there was a careful balance between the search for
economic support and the desire for security-related assistance. Whereas the eco-
nomic support came largely from the West and the financial institutions, the secu-
rity-related support came from the so-called progressive regimes.
The regime saw nothing wrong with the pursuit of liberal economic policies and
its disregard for the fundamental rights of the people. The disregard for due process
seemed to be a fallout of the relations with the progressive regimes. Tight security
and the abuse of the rights of many Ghanaians converged, more or less, to facilitate
IMF/World Bank economic stabilisation. As later events in the international system
proved,(28) it was an incongruous blend of domestic politics and international eco-
nomic relations. It, however, succeeded because the policy incidentally had the
covert support of the Bank and the Fund. Until the collapse of communism, the two
institutions openly courted and favoured the grant of loans to dictators.(29)
A distinction appears to have been drawn between what the progressive regimes
could offer and what the West could give. The PNDC’s relations with the Eastern
bloc, especially after the ideological shift, and before the collapse of communism
was, therefore, motivated principally by the need for security training for revolution-
ary cadre. It ought to be stressed, however, that the foundation of such relationships
with progressive regime were laid before the PNDC committed “ideological sui-
cide” by turning to the West for economic reasons.
After the overthrow of the PNP government, the PNDC immediately restored
diplomatic relations with Libya that had been severed by President Limann, and
went on to open diplomatic missions in Cuba and Bulgaria.(30) Ghana entered into
economic and cultural agreements with Cuba, the former German Democratic
Republic, Bulgaria, Ethiopia (under Mengistu), China, Mozambique, Nicaragua
(under the Sandinistas led by Daniel Ortega) and Romania under Ceausescu.
Revolutionary cadres were also sent to Cuba, Bulgaria and Libya for training. It
became a standard policy for newly recruited foreign-service personnel to be given
six-months training in Bulgaria in what was termed a study in “mobilisation for
national development.” There was no doubt, however, that most of the people were
trained in military tactics, espionage, sabotage, guerrilla warfare and political indoc-
trination of the socialist hue. A large number of secret service personnel and com-
mandos who were the security backbone of the PNDC and currently of the National
Democratic Congress (NDC) had been trained in the USSR, Bulgaria, and Cuba. A
sizeable number of those trained in Bulgaria and Cuba also found themselves in the
outfit of the former security chief Captain Kojo Tsikata who was also the PNDC
member in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ACR, 1985/86, B 40). Others
served on new structures of state control such as the Citizens’ Vetting Committees
86 K. Boafo-ARTHUR
20-2/1  03.4.3  9:48 AM  ページ86
(CVCs), National Investigating Committees (NICs), and the Bureau of National
Investigation (BNI).
Cultural and trade agreements were also signed with some of these countries.
Under such agreements, several Ghanaians were awarded scholarships to study in
various fields in Moscow and Cuba. Some companies in the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) and Bulgaria won Ghana government contracts. What were not
made known to the general public, ostensibly for security reasons, were the security
training components of the agreements. The point remains, however, that the PNDC
knew what it wanted from the international community and went in for it.
To buttress the pragmatic approach of the regime, relations with the Middle East
especially the oil producing countries and those in the Gulf region, were stepped up.
It synchronised with the PNDC Policy Guidelines that advocated “closer collabora-
tion with progressive countries as well as friendship and co-operation with all
advanced and prosperous nations, as well as all the oil producing countries” (Boafo-
Arthur, 1989: 137). Economic motives were crucial in the relations with most coun-
tries in the Middle East. It was natural for the regime to have very good relations
with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). This might have been motivated
by the need to gain support from Arab countries supportive of the PLO. More
importantly, it was in line with traditional Ghanaian foreign policy of support for
decolonization whether in Africa or elsewhere.
The PNDC obtained assistance from various funds operated by Arab countries for
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, in 1988 the Kuwait Fund granted
to the government $3.5 million for the Northern Power Grid at three and half per
cent interest rate, three years grace period and a repayment period of fifteen years.
In addition, between 1985 and 1987 the Saudi Fund granted over $114 million to
Ghana for various projects. These included the building of grain storage silos,
Science College, the Rehabilitation of the Tema and Takoradi ports, and the
Northern Power Grid. Interest charges on the various loans ranged between one and
four per cent. Generous repayment terms were offered.(31) In the same year, the Arab
Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) granted Ghana a loan of $10
million for the rehabilitation of the cocoa industry. The repayment period was fifteen
years, a grace period of five years and interest at five percent.(32)
Financial assistance from the two Bretton Woods institutions for both short and
long term programmes is, however, unprecedented in the annals of Ghana’s che-
quered relationship with the institutions. Consequently, the Ghanaian economy
under the PNDC became aid-driven. There is no indication that this has changed
under the NDC.
Under the PNDC Ghana became the largest per capita aid recipient in Africa. In
1985 alone, “total foreign exchange resources including export earnings, inflows of
private and official loans and transfers, and IMF drawings amounted to $1.3 billion.
This was a 19 per cent increase on 1984s $1.1 billion” (ACR, 1985/86: B 42).
Indisputably, Ghana’s dependency on external sources of finance deepened beyond
all expectations. As noted by Colin Legum (1984/85: B 462), Ghana’s pattern of
dependency under the PNDC became “reduced to the simple need for large-scale
hard currency finance in every sphere of the economy.” According to the U.S.
Department of State report on Ghana, “the World Bank, the largest donor, gives
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assistance at an annual level of approximately $300 million in the form of sectoral
and structural adjustment credits” (Quoted in Boafo-Arthur, 1999b: 12). Nana
Wereko Ampem II (1994: 50) a former government statistician and a member of the
UN Investments Committee since 1980 has also noted that Ghana has been receiv-
ing considerable inflows of external finance to the tune of $500-600 million per
year. Again, since the change in ideological orientation and the close relations with
the IMF/World Bank, external donors have injected a total of $8 billion into the
Ghanaian economy (Appiah-Opoku, 1998: 6-10). The immediate impact of the
steady inflow of foreign aid is the mounting debt obligations and increased debt-ser-
vice ratio as shown in table 1.
Table 1 shows a quantum leap in debt service ratio from 28.9 per cent in 1986 to
62.8 per cent in 1988. Total external debt by the time the PNDC democratised at the
end of 1992 had also increased from the 1988 figure of $2.270 billion to $4.88 bil-
lion. By the end of 1997 the debt had risen to $6.4 billion (EIU, 1998). Donor con-
ferences on Ghana sponsored by the World Bank became a virtual annual ritual.
Table 2 shows some of the IMF/World Bank supported financial pledges made at
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Table 1. Long term debt(a) (US$ millions).
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Total 1,177 1,144 1,290 1,686 2,158 2,270
of which:
public & publicly
guaranteed 1,156 1,112 1,250 1,648 2,128 2,238
of which:
multilateral creditors 372 402 539 795 1,152 1,318
bilateral creditors 642 584 552 621 708 692
private creditors 142 127 159 232 269 228
Total debt service 146 143 218 237 452 577
as % of export of
goods & services 30.5 23.3 32.2 28.9 49.9 62.8
Net transfers 309 193 93 166 33 －8
(a): Debt with maturity of one year or over, outstanding and disbursed.
Source: EIU Country Report ,Ghana, No. 1, 1990, p. 21
Table 2. Paris donor conference financial pledges to ghana.
Year Amount Expected Actual Pledge








Sources: Compiled from Africa Contemporary Record, EIU Country Report on Ghana and West Africa:
various years.
(a): In addition to the $450m in pledges, $75m in export credit was given. However, the bilateral com-
ponent of the pledges was reduced from $150m in 1983 to $115m. The World Bank contributed slightly
more than the 1983 figure of $93m.
(b): Of this amount, $500m and $430m were pledged by bilateral and multilateral sources respectively.
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various donor conferences in Paris.(33)
It is worth noting further that in June 1993, barely six months after the transition
to democracy, Ghana received a commitment of $2.1 billion in assistance for 1993-
94 at donors’ meeting in Paris chaired by the World Bank. The Bank had earlier
indicated that Ghana needed $1.7 billion.
VIII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The PNDC regime’s greatest achievement with regard to international economic
relations was the very close relations it forged with the West and especially with the
IMF and the World Bank. This is because other regimes could not reach such
accords with the IMF and the World Bank. Those who did or attempted had serious
political backlash.
The PNDC was consequently extolled by the Bank, the Fund and individuals for a
successful implementation of stabilisation policies. The compliments were the
results of increased national growth rate recorded after the implementation of stabil-
isation policies. At the 1984 Paris donors meeting, Ghana’s increased growth rate
from 0.7 per cent to 5.5 per cent was described as “courageous” and “an exemplary
model” for Sub-Saharan Africa (ACR, 1985/86). That set the tone for deluge of
commendations. The PNDC’s 1987 budget statement indicated that GDP increased
by 5.3 per cent in the previous year. Per capita income grew by 2.6 per cent and
agricultural output increased by 4.6 per cent. Inflation witnessed a high level of
moderation declining from 122 per cent in 1983 to 40 per cent in 1984 and 10 per
cent in 1985. (However, by 1989 inflation had shot up to 25 per cent.)
External financial resources were procured to rehabilitate agriculture, especially
cocoa production. Exports of both traditional and non-traditional commodities were
stimulated due to increased incentives for exporters. Foreign exchange earnings
from the traditional exports of goods and services increased by almost one hundred
per cent from US$460 million in 1983 to US$912 million in 1989. The value of
non-traditional exports which was a meagre US$5.5 million in 1983 increased to
US$42.4 million in 1988 (Anyemedu, 1993). In addition, mining received a tremen-
dous boost due to trade liberalisation and divestiture of some state-owned mining
companies.(34) The positive outcome of this was the high production figure of
342,188 ounces of gold produced in 1991. In fact, this increased further to
1,261,000 ounces in 1993. Under the liberalisation programme, gold has overtaken
cocoa as the leading foreign exchange earner for the country.
In the view of John Toye (1991: 155) the PNDC created “Africa’s most successful
stabilisation and structural adjustment program...” if compared with the state of the
Ghanaian economy before the implementation of the programme. For John Healey
and Mark Robinson, (1992) Ghana’s experiences with adjustment under the PNDC
were a manifestation of political commitment, capacity and skill, as well as bureau-
cratic competence, independence and probity.
PNDC’s foreign economic policies energised the macroeconomic indicators.
Kwesi Anyemedu (1993: 34), a lecturer in economics who was once on secondment
to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning during the time of the PNDC,
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noted that “economic growth, if it does nothing at all, increases the range of choice.
It could be well argued that, although it did not guarantee generalised benefits in
terms of ‘trickle down’ theory, it generally made the satisfaction of the basic needs
of the community easier, if the satisfaction of these needs was also a major goal of
policy.”
This position is highly contentious. How could the basic needs of the majority of
Ghanaians be satisfied in the absence of any “trickle down” effects? One is tempted
to ask in this context the relevance of a national policy that succeeds in only creating
a class of novel rich at the expense of the majority of the people. If the stabilisation
measures had had the desired positive impact on a majority of the people, then one
would have given unqualified credit to the PNDC for successful international eco-
nomic relations. If policy actions by nations are aimed at obtaining the highest good
for the citizenry, I do not think this was the case under the PNDC. The policies may
have been well intentioned. However, altruism happens to be inadequate with regard
to the general welfare of the people. The anticipated positive economic outcomes
were frustratingly slow while the nation’s external debt burden doubled. The impact
on the poor left much to be deserved. This led to the implementation of the
Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social effects of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in
1988.
The introduction of PAMSCAD with the objective of lessening the burden on the
poor as a result of the ‘religious’ implementation of externally imposed economic
policies without any local input, to my mind, undermined the high praises heaped on
the PNDC government in the corridors of international financial institutions. PAM-
SCAD itself provided another avenue for further foreign assistance (EIU, 1988).
The mode of implementation coupled with the negative implications of the unbri-
dled, rigid, and anti-people IMF/World Bank sponsored policies on Ghanaians
equally raise questions about national sovereignty. Whether we like it or not, the
loss of national sovereignty was not only phenomenal, it was also unparalleled in
the political economy of Ghana’s external economic relations. There is no basis for
the magnitude of the loss of national self-respect to be compared with what Ghana
experienced under the Second Republic. Anyemedu (1993: 41) noted, and it is
worth quoting his words extensively:
The ERP has to a very large extent been financed by IMF and World Bank credits sub-
ject to policy conditionalities. This has implied a degree of control over economic
policies in Ghana by the IMF/World Bank, as well as the pervasive influence of
assorted consultants, advisers and experts, which have reached intolerable levels not
only for the professional classes and students, but also for workers. These groups of
Ghanaians have all in various times expressed misgivings about the degree of external
control over the economy. There was hardly a day when there was not an IMF or
World Bank mission in Ghana. All types of advisers and consultants were installed in
virtually every major public institution. John Loxley (1988) pointed out that it was
common knowledge that major agreements are typed in Washington for signature by
the Ghanaian government and that often, because of bureaucratic delays in the govern-
ment, the Bank will actually draft its responses to its own proposals on behalf of the
Government (my emphasis).
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Ghana under the PNDC was a captive of the IMF/World Bank. Due to high levels of
retrenchment of labour, imposition of user fees in hospitals, high cost of living, and
poor salaries, despondency, fear, and uncertainty were the lot of majority of
Ghanaians. In January1990 Rawlings himself declared:
I should be the first to admit that the Economic Recovery Programme has not provided
all the answers to our national problems. In spite of all this international acclaim it has
received, the effects of its gains remain to be felt in most households and pockets ...
Notwithstanding the vast improvements in the supply of goods and services in the
market today, there are many who have found it difficult, during the past holiday sea-
son, to manage a modest celebration with a chicken for a meal or a new dress for a
child or a bottle of schnapps for the folks back home (Nugent, 1990: B 50).
Earlier on April 30, 1988 Captain Kojo Tsikata (the security chief and a member of
the PNDC with oversight over the Ministry of Foreign affairs) while addressing rev-
olutionary cadres noted:
A new impetus is needed for the ERP to ensure the expected improvements in the liv-
ing conditions of ordinary Ghanaians materialize as soon as possible ... The time has
come when after all the sacrifices of the working people, attention must now be
focused on the adequacy of wages and salaries. The welfare of the people is the
supreme test of the success of the nation’s economic policies and not the performance
criteria of the international financial institutions. It is not the mere compliance with the
conditions of the IMF that must concern us. We must ensure that an increasing portion
of the benefits of the ERP goes to farmers, soldiers, policemen, and workers who have
sacrificed so much for the revolutionary process (my emphasis). (ACR, 1988: B 38)
Workers had to contend with persistent erosion of wages and salaries because the
World Bank prescription includes rigid control of public sector wages although it is
a well-known fact that wages in Ghana are one of the lowest in the whole world
(Jeong, 1996). It is evident, therefore, that the welfare of the people which is the
supreme test of the success of the international economic relations or foreign eco-
nomic policies of the PNDC was compromised for the sake of unimpeded flow of
external finance.
The overly negative implications of the policies on majority of Ghanaians, includ-
ing the well-established entrepreneurs, compelled P. V. Obeng, the long-serving sec-
retary to the PNDC, to admit to the mistakes of the government. In an interview
with West Africa (5-11 March, 1990: 359) magazine he stated:
We would certainly (with hindsight) have avoided the over-liberalisation of certain
economic activities. We pursued a policy of trade liberalisation even though we had
not put some of our local industry on sound footing ... But we now appreciate that we
brought in trade liberalisation at a time when other sectors of industry that were not
yet on the priority list were not on their feet. So these sectors suffered anti-dumping
pressures, they suffered infant industries’ problems and in the end they were recover-
ing at a pace that was far below expectation.
Why then did the regime maintain the tempo even to the point of guaranteeing its
continuity as a core element of the manifesto of the party formed by Rawlings to
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succeed the PNDC? The answer, to my mind, could be traced, to the insatiable
desire of the power brokers to maintain their rule and thereby their economic well-
being which the constant flow of external aid without any clear-cut monitoring by
the donors had, either by omission or commission, guaranteed.
IX. CONCLUSION
Foreign policy orientation either economic or political by the PNDC was bal-
anced and unparalleled; the main impetus was the aggressive quest for economic
support for national development. In the process, the policy approach adopted with
its preponderant economic bias targeted at the IMF/World Bank and other IFIs was
unique. Sustained relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions and other IFIs
was however contingent upon the rigid implementation of donor-brokered stabilisa-
tion programme with little or no input at all by the government.
The outcome of policy measures were a mixed bag of overblown positive macro-
economic indicators on the one hand, and on the other a grudgingly acknowledged
persistent depreciation in the quality of life of most Ghanaians.
The question is whether the deprivation, disregard for the due process of law, and
destruction of the environment, during the period under review make the so-called
gains worthy of praise. More importantly, have the policy measures laid the founda-
tion for rapid economic take-off that would impact positively on the living condi-
tions of majority of Ghanaians in the long-run?
What is certain is that the foreign economic policies and the mode of their appli-
cation have mortgaged the future of generations of Ghanaians. As noted, the most
serious negative implication is the fact that the PNDC created an economy that is
aid-driven. This does not bode well for economic planning and national develop-
ment in the long term. Investors trickling into the country have been highly selec-
tive. They prefer investments in economic activities with quick returns such as
mining and other extractive ventures instead of laying the basis for industrialisation.
Investments in manufacturing by the foreign investors were negligible. Incessant
demands for further concessions by investors betrayed their real motives. While Mr.
P. V. Obeng was lamenting the fact that the PNDC over-liberalised, representatives
of investors were also arguing that the regime had not gone far enough. For
instance, in spite of the liberal investment code put in place in 1985, the representa-
tive of the International Finance Corporation called for more concessions. They
argued, maybe rightly that “success in attracting foreign investment depends on
matching the incentives and tax conditions offered by other countries competing for
foreign investment, since profit-maximization is the force driving foreign investors”
(ACR, 1989/90: B 50). Indeed, this shows the paradox of an aid-driven economy.
Everything had to be done to suit external constituents with scant attention to the
long-term implications for the present and future generations. So long as the inter-
ests of those in authority were satisfied they never saw anything wrong.
The top hierarchy of the PNDC realised their impotence in making independent
decisions on account of prior commitment to abide by IMF/World Bank dictates.
Consistent pursuit of externally inspired policies, to a large extent, assisted in
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grounding the regime’s hold on political power. This is because the donors turned a
blind eye to numerous human right abuses perpetrated by the regime.
Another issue of great concern in developmental terms is the fact that the external
financial assistance received by the PNDC was higher in relation to what some of
the fast growing Asian countries received at their periods of take-off. The World
Bank in its report titled Ghana 2000 and Beyond “points out that external financial
assistance played a modest role in financing the rapid growth of Malaysia and
Thailand, and that annual capital inflows were less than 3% of GDP during the
period 1969-1983. This compares with inflows into Ghana of about 8% of GDP in
recent years.”(35) Thus, if the development threshold has not been crossed and we do
not even know whether we will cross it in the near future, then there were funda-
mental flaws in the policy measures.
The praises notwithstanding, Tony Killick and Moazzam Malik (1992: 610) put
the bleak future for Ghana succinctly:
Ghana’s recovery...was based on abnormally high levels of assistance from the IMF,
the World Bank and bilateral donors, making it especially difficult to disentangle the
effects of the aid from the effects of the programme. Finally, capital formation, espe-
cially in the private sector, remains depressed, with total investment ratio estimated in
the range of 6-12 per cent in 1988. Ghana’s impressive turnaround remains fragile.
(my emphasis)
The implication is that the nation has a long way to go after years of excruciating
adjustment policies even if the positive macroeconomic indicators for the country
are deemed reliable.
In theoretical terms, the PNDC adopted multiple concepts. In one sense, the
modus operandi of the regime both economically and politically supported neo-lib-
eral postulation of the interrelationship between domestic and foreign policy.
Furthermore, the realist position of the primacy of state security in the pursuit of for-
eign policy objectives was catered for through relationship with progressive regimes
that offered security-related training to cadres. Strands of the nationalist conceptuali-
sation of the primacy of domestic policy could also be seen.
Clearly, apart from the first thirteen months of its administration where its theoret-
ical underpinning could be termed Marxism-Leninism, policy measures in latter
years, up to the period of democratic transition in January 1993, were propelled by
admixture or at best ad hoc theoretical grounding with neo-liberalism being the
superstructure. Even with that, the regime could not adopt neo-liberal tenets in its
entirety. As argued by Ho-Won Jeong (1996: 67), “in formulating the adjustment
program, major decision makers were insulated from general social and political cir-
cumstances and popular concerns. The masses were excluded from active participa-
tion in the discussion of economic issues that influence their daily life. Adjustment
policy, therefore, is a summary affirmation of state interests defined by a narrow cir-
cle of leadership and officials of international agencies.” In that regard, the PNDC
was opportunistic as well as pragmatic in the execution of its international economic
relations.
It is the burden of the NDC, an offshoot of the PNDC, to make judicious use of
the financial inflows to minimise national over dependence on foreign aid and
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thereby assure Ghanaians of a better future through their mode of international eco-
nomic relations. It is equally the duty of all socio-economic forces to help the gov-
ernment in power to attain what the generality of Ghanaians desire.
* Dr. Kwame Boafo-Arthur is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of
Ghana, Legon. He is also a Barrister-at-Law. He was a 1997-98 Fulbright Senior African
Research Scholar at the University of California, Los Angeles. His publications have
been mainly in the area of Ghana’s Politics and International Relations, Foreign Aid and
Development, Structural Adjustment and Democratisation, and International Integration.
NOTES
(1) The relationship put in place by the PNDC has not been abandoned because the PNDC
succeeded itself by forming a political party, National Democratic Congress (NDC), to
contest general elections in November/December 1992. Its campaign slogan was the
continuity of policies pursued by the PNDC.
(2) Traditional foreign policy concerns until the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the dis-
mantling of apartheid had revolved around support for liberation struggles in Africa,
commitment to non-alignment, opposition to racism and minority rule in Africa and sup-
port for the OAU and other international organisations.
(3) As compared with the PNDC, the civilian governments of the Progress Party (PP) and
the Peoples’ National Party (PNP) had relatively short periods of twenty- seven months
each before they were overthrown by the military. Thus in terms of all governments
since independence, the PNDC had the longest reign and, therefore, all the time to pur-
sue whatever policies it had.
(4) These approaches, in the words of Naomi Chazan, have run the gamut of “non-align-
ment, an avowedly pro-Western orientation, disengagement, external supplication and
purposeful isolation.” (See Naomi Chazan, “GHANA” in Timothy Shaw and Olajide
Aluko eds. The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy, London: Gower, 1984, p.
94.) It must be added that these shifts in foreign policy orientations moved in tandem
with various developmental strategies.
(5) For a comprehensive discussion of Nkrumah’s high profile foreign policy approach see
W. Scott Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966, New Jersey, Princeton
University Press, 1969.
(6) The Prime Minister, Dr. Busia split the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning into
two just to strip his Finance Minister J.H. Mensah, who was opposed to most of the IMF
measures, of sufficient control of finance matters. The new Ministry of Finance came
directly under the Prime Minister while the Finance Minister was asked to oversee the
Ministry of Planning. Interestingly enough, Busia preferred to listen to IMF and Bank
officials than the advice of the Ghanaian officials. For details of the political economy of
the PP government’s relations with international finance capital represented by the IMF
and the Bank see Libby Roland, “External Co-optation of a Less Developed Country’s
Policy-Making: The Case of Ghana 1969-1972,” World Politics, 1, October 1976, pp.
67-89.
(7) For details on some of the economic policies adopted by Acheampong’s NRC, see
Kwame Boafo-Arthur, “Trends in Ghana’s Foreign Policy After Nkrumah,” in E.
Hanson and K.A. Ninsin ed. The State, Development, and Politics in Ghana, Dakar,
CODESRIA Book Series, 1989, pp. 135-153.
(8) Acheampong professed to be an admirer of Nkrumah’s economic policies. Thus his
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approach won him instant support from like-minded groups most of whom traced their
political roots to the Convention Peoples’ Party of Nkrumah.
(9) In March 1974, the medium-term debt of the country was rescheduled. Under the
rescheduled agreement, all debts due for payment after February 1, 1972 with regard to
pre-1966 debt obligations were to be paid over a period of twenty-eight years with a
grace period of ten years with an interest of two and a half per cent per annum.
(10) The Fund gave the following preconditions which were accepted by the SMC II under
the chairmanship of General Fred Akuffo: 58% devaluation of the national currency,
reduction in budgetary deficits, prompt repayment of external debt, and an increase in
the producer price of cocoa. Later the SMC was prevailed upon to change the Ghana
currency.
(11) Ideologically, Nkrumah and his followers were opposed to IMF prescriptions. President
Limann, for instance, argued that every interaction with the IMF must be based on the
social needs of Ghanains.
(12) To a large extent, self- interest has been a strong motivating factor for international cred-
itors that are in favour debtor countries reaching an agreement with the IMF and the
World Bank. Such agreements that incorporates the well known conditionalitiest assure
them ready repayments of loans some of which might have been contracted by corrupt
leaders under questionable circumstances.
(13) The military has been a thorn in the flesh of civilian administrators with flippant inter-
ventions, especially in 1972 and 1981.
(14) The regime started by claiming to be Marxist oriented. The key advisers turned out to be
hardcore leftist from the University of Ghana. As a result, the earlier policy measures
taken had the imprints of efforts to ensure the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’
(15) Majority of the advisers of the PNDC belonged to the radical left of Ghanaian politics.
This group opposed any form of international interactions that was bound to solidify the
already inequitable incorporation of the nation into the global economy. The radical left
was an outspoken opponent of any form of relationship with the Bretton Woods institu-
tions. The regime had to contend also with opposition from the right that was the other
key political focal point in the country.
(16) For instance, Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah a member of the PNDC and B.B.D. Asamoah,
Secretary to the PNDC overtly espoused the beliefs of the radical left.
(17) Kwame Boafo-Arthur, “Ghana’s External Relations Since 31 December 1981,” in
Gyimah-Boadi ed., Ghana Under PNDC Rule, Dakar, CODESRIA Book Series, 1993, p.
143.
(18) Emmanuel Hansen, “The State and Popular Struggles in Ghana, 1982-1986,” in Peter
Anyang Nyong’o ed. Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa, London: ZED 1987,
pp. 170-173.
(19) Kweku G. Folson, “Ideology, Revolution and Development-The Years of Jerry John
Rawlings” in Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi ed. op cit. p. 83.
(20) Another explanation is that most of the young Marxists who fled into exile were impli-
cated, one way or the other, in the abortive coup of November 1982 that nearly toppled
the PNDC. Some also clearly feared for their lives, given the “blood and thunder” poli-
tics of the period which they had contributed to in its execution.
(21) It was impractical in the sense that the West would not be prepared to help a revolution-
ary regime that was not prepared to open up both economically and politically. Thus the
PNDC was faced with the problem of maintaining high revolutionary profile whilst at
the same time trying to woo Western capital. One was bound to overshadow the other. In
the Ghanaian case the liberalising wind finally consigned the so-called socialist revolu-
tion into the dustbin of history.
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(22) See Yao Graham, “From GTP to Assene: Aspects of Industrial Working Class Struggles
182-1986” in Hanson and Ninsin eds., op. cit., pp. 43-72 for detailed analysis of an
example of workers take over of the management of an industrial establishment.
(23) For details of the initial economic measures adopted by the PNDC before its change of
orientation, see James C.W. Ahiakpor, “The Success and Failure of Dependency Theory:
The Experience of Ghana” in International Organization, 39, 3, Summer 1985, pp. 534-
552.
(24) The PNDC contended with several abortive military coups. The most serious was the
one of November 1982 when the government was nearly toppled. The support base of
these coups cut across the ideological spectrum. It appears, however, that the early signs
of the possibility of going to the IMF emboldened the ultra-leftist within the army who
were the supporters of Aloga Akate-Pore, the key architect of the 1981 military take-
over, to try to dislodge the PNDC from power. The successful crushing of the abortive
coups forced many of the leftist to flee into exile and made it possible for the PNDC to
negotiate with the IMF without any serious opposition form within its own ranks and
core support base.
(25) Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah made the statement less than one month after the declaration
of the so-called revolution by Rawlings. It was a period when the majority of the core
supporters, both within and without the PNDC, were not in the mood to reflect on such
moderate stance. Juxtaposed with the Policy Guidelines of the PNDC, the willingness to
deal with all irrespective of ideological inclinations during that period was a heresy. It is
not surprising that Nunoo-Mensah lost his place on the PNDC and had to live in exile
for some time.
(26) This seems to be the case because the PNDC had succeeded in intimidating political
opponents and those capable of challenging the unbridled relationship with the
IMF/World Bank. One key fact is that those who found themselves in the PNDC govern-
ment were the traditionally vocal socialist group who throughout Ghana’s political his-
tory had opposed IMF/World Bank policies. Some of those with the government who
were opposed to IMF/World Bank lost the contest for dominance and fled into exile.
Those who stayed in the country had to shut up. It appears also that Ghanaians wanted to
allow the policies to run their courses and see the overall outcome for the national econ-
omy.
(27) For details on the measures taken by the PNDC to subjugate Ghanaians in order to pur-
sue its brand of foreign economic policies see the following. Adu Boahen, The
Ghanaian Sphinx; Reflections on the Contemporary History of Ghana: 1972-1987,
Accra, Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1992; E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Economic Recovery
and Politics in PNDC’s Ghana,” The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics, vol. xxviii, no. 3, 1990; Ahiakpor James, “The Success and Failure of
Dependency Theory: The Ghanaian Experience” International Organization, 39, 3, sum-
mer 1985; and Kwame Boafo-Arthur, “Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) in
Ghana: Interrogating the PNDC’s Implementation” Journal of African Policy Studies (in
Press).
(28) These were the changes in international power configurations after the collapse of the
communist bloc and the consequent tying of external aid to good governance, including
respect for human rights.
(29) This point is argued in detail in Kwame Boafo-Arthur, “Ghana: Structural Adjustment,
Democratization and the Politics of Continuity” African Studies Review vol. 42, No. 2,
1999. See also Kwame Boafo-Arthur, “Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) in
Ghana: Interrogating the PNDC’s Implementation” The Journal of African Policy
Studies (in press).
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(30) This was in spite of the fact that on assuming power the regime had closed down twelve
Ghanaian missions in 1982 with the aim of cutting down cost.
(31) The grace periods ranged between four and ten years, and repayments ranged between
fourteen and forty years. See Kwame Boafo-Arthur, “Ghana’s External Relations...” op.
cit., p. 147.
(32) See Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, no. 2 1988.
(33) Pledges from donors at the Paris conferences happened to be just aspects of various
financial inflows from bilateral and multilateral sources. Table 2, therefore, shows a
small fraction of all financial receipts by the PNDC during the period. For instance, in
1987 total pledges amounted to $818 million. However, loans independent of the
pledges were granted. Switzerland granted $6.5 for rehabilitation at Korle Bu Teaching
Hospital; the US approved an $8 million commodity package from its PL 480 pro-
gramme; and Japan provided $6.6 million to support SAP and a $3.4 million grant for
telecommunication.
(34) Between 1983-1984 alone, a $131 million of Fund assistance was expended on the reha-
bilitation of the cocoa industry. The World Bank’s International Development
Association (IDA) also allocated $24 million of a $92 million export reconstruction
grants to the cocoa sector in 1984. With regard to mining the government divested itself
of some of the mines previously controlled by the State Gold Mining Corporation. Local
people were also granted licences to prospects for gold. Scant attention was paid to the
long-term effects of environmental degradation, especially with regard to surface min-
ing.
(35) Nana Wereko Ampem II, op. cit., p. 51.
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